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Abstract 
As demand for electricity from renewable energy sources grows, there is increasing 
interest, and public and financial support, for local communities to become involved 
in the development of renewable energy projects. In the UK, Community Benefit 
payments are the most common financial link between renewable energy projects and 
local communities. These are goodwill payments from the project developer for the 
community to spend as it wishes. However, if an ownership stake in the renewable 
energy project were possible, receipts to the local community would potentially be 
considerably higher. The local economic impacts of these receipts are difficult to 
quantify using traditional Input-Output techniques, but can be more appropriately 
handled within a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) framework where income flows 
between agents can be traced in detail. We use a SAM for the Shetland Islands to 
evaluate the potential local economic and employment impact of a large onshore wind 
energy project proposed for the Islands. Sensitivity analysis is used to show how the 
local impact varies with: the level of Community Benefit payments; the portion of 
intermediate inputs being sourced from within the local economy; and the level of any 
local community ownership of the project. By a substantial margin, local ownership 
confers the greatest economic impacts for the local community. 
 
Keywords:  renewable energy; rural economic impacts; revenue sharing; community 
ownership 
 
JEL codes: Q42, R15, O18 
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1. Introduction 
 
Recent UK and Scottish government policy has sought to increase the share of 
electricity generated from renewable energy technologies. As stated in the 2007 
Energy White Paper (DTI, 2007), renewable energy technologies can contribute to 
UK energy diversity as well as to meeting national environmental targets. While most 
energy issues in Scotland are reserved to the UK Government, some aspects of policy 
have been devolved to the Scottish Government. These include responsibility for 
encouraging the development of renewable energy technologies at the regional level, 
as well as powers under Section 36 of the Electricity Act (1989) for all electricity 
generating projects with an installed capacity greater than 50MW (Allan et al, 2008). 
The current Scottish Government has set a target that by 2020, 50% of electricity 
generated in Scotland will come from renewable energy sources (Scottish 
Government, 2007). It is currently likely that a significant share of this target will be 
met by on-shore and off-shore wind capacity, and that much of the new capacity will 
continue to be located in peripheral areas, away from existing population centres. 
 
Conventional cost-benefit analyses (CBA) of energy projects can be an 
important input into the planning process. CBA analysis quantifies the relevant 
market and non-market impacts, and indicates whether an individual project makes a 
positive or negative contribution to economic welfare. However CBA analyses 
typically neglect the local economic development impacts of such projects.
1
Moran 
and Sherrington (2007) perform a CBA for an onshore windfarm proposal (the Clyde 
620MW development in South Lanarkshire, Scotland). They consider the market and 
non-market costs and benefits of the project. Market costs include capital investment, 
operation and maintenance, extra balancing costs to the grid and land rental payments. 
Key non-market costs are CO2 emissions during manufacture and construction and 
visual and noise use and non-use disamenity value. Market benefits are: output 
revenues, avoided fuel costs and avoided GDP losses, while non-market benefits are 
the avoided emissions of CO2. Omitted from this analysis is the local economic 
stimulus that might arise from the development. However, in practice this is likely to 
be critical in determining whether the host community agrees to the implementation 
of any renewable energy project. Therefore, it may be important for the success of the 
Scottish and UK governments renewable energy targets that the economic 
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development potential of windfarms be explicitly acknowledged and quantified, 
wherever possible. 
 
Impact analyses typically employ some form of Keynesian multiplier 
framework to examine the system-wide effects of local economic development 
initiatives. These are demand driven models that identify the knock on effects of 
increased local expenditure. The most sophisticated of these studies employ input-
output (IO) tables that capture the structure of linkages among the production sectors 
of the local economy (Miller and Blair, 1985). The IO models that can be developed 
using these databases have, however, certain drawbacks when used for identifying the 
economic development impact of onshore windfarm projects. The most important 
weakness in the present context is that the projects themselves do not typically have 
strong backward linkages into the local economy through purchases of intermediate 
inputs or labour (Allan et al, 2007)2. Low intermediate backward linkages for an 
operational onshore windfarm would be captured by a low (i.e. close to unity) IO 
output multiplier, signifying low indirect and induced impacts on economic activity 
from the windfarm
3
. 
 
However, while windfarms generally have low intermediate linkage with their 
host economies, they can generate significant income flows, a portion of which may 
remain in the local economy. These flows are not typically identified and incorporated 
in IO models. In particular, a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) analysis of the 
economic impacts may provide a much more useful approach. While an IO table only 
shows linkages associated with industrial production, a SAM provides details of all 
monetary flows within an economy. This would include transfers between agents, 
including profit payments. A SAM consequently is a natural framework in which to 
explore the impact of alternative assumptions about the distribution and uses of 
income flows associated with the windfarm development. Recently, Roberts (2005) 
uses SAM-based analysis to explore the transmission of economic disturbances 
between rural households and rural businesses for the Western Isles region of 
Scotland. More details on Social Accounting Matrices can be found in Round (2003) 
and Thorbecke (1998). 
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It has been acknowledged that: The routine provision of meaningful benefits 
to communities hosting wind power projects is likely to be a significant factor in 
sustaining public support and delivering significant rates of wind power development 
(Centre for Sustainable Energy, 2005a, p. 6). Similarly work by Trent and Stout-
Wiegand (1985) found stronger local support for projects which were anticipated to 
be beneficial for the local area
4
. Two alternative ways in which direct payments can 
be made to the local community is through Community Benefit (CB) schemes and 
local ownership
5
. In this paper, we demonstrate for the small, rural economy of the 
Shetland Islands how a Social Accounting Matrix (SAM) might be used to provide 
quantitative estimates of the possible economic impacts of a renewable energy 
development. We establish how the scale and nature of the impacts vary with 
Community Benefit payments and with any ownership share held by the local 
community.  
 
CB is a goodwill contribution voluntarily donated by a developer for the 
benefit of communities affected by development where this will have a long-term 
impact on the environment (Highland Council, 2006, p. 1). Such payments must not 
be seen as buying planning consent and the level of any CB payments agreed 
should not influence the planning decision (Forward Scotland, 2006). Such payments 
should compensate the residents of affected communities for the disruption caused 
during pre-planning, construction and the operation of the turbines, including any loss 
of visual or environmental amenity. Appendix 1 shows the level of CB payments 
made by each of the fifty-seven operational windfarms in Scotland. While the level of 
CB varies between schemes, such payments are made in most operational 
developments, and tend to be greater for the more recent projects. As mentioned in 
footnote 5, CB payments do not reflect the only financial links which operational 
windfarms can have with the communities in which they are located, but are perhaps 
the most obvious way in which local communities benefit from the development. 
 
Over the last few years, in an increasing number of renewable energy projects 
the local community has taken an ownership share. One reason for this is the 
increasingly prevalent view that the problems faced in rural Scotland might be best 
addressed through social enterprises: businesses with primarily social objectives  
wider than employment provision and contribution to public revenue through tax  
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that reinvest the surplus of their operations in the business or in the community rather 
than seeking to maximise profit for shareholders and owners (Zografos, 2007, p. 38). 
Recent Scottish Government policy has acknowledged the potential for this ownership 
model, and has made changes to planning policy to support such developments 
(Scottish Government, 2007). Scottish Planning Policy 6 (SPP6): Renewable Energy 
(Scottish Executive, 2007, p. 6) explicitly states that there is potential, particularly in 
rural areas, for communities to invest in ownership of renewable energy projects or to 
develop their own local projects for local benefit planning authorities should put in 
place positive policies to enable communities to develop such initiatives. On CB 
payments, SPP6 states that local authorities may facilitate and encourage such 
initiatives (Scottish Executive, 2007, p. 6). Since devolution, and the founding of the 
Scottish Parliament with powers to encourage renewable energy, the planning system 
has been recognised as a major tool through which policymakers can aid the growth 
of renewable energy technologies
6
.  
  
Financial support for Scottish communities wanting to develop renewable 
energy projects is available through a number of avenues, including the National 
Lottery Growing Community Assets programme, while advice and practical 
experience on seeking funding from these sources is provided by groups such as the 
Highlands and Islands Community Energy Company. This body started as a 
subsidiary of Highlands and Islands Enterprise, a government backed economic 
development agency, and will shortly become an independent not-for-profit group in 
its own right  Community Energy Scotland  extending the range of its remit across 
Scotland. At the UK level there is also advice for communities looking to secure 
benefits from renewable energy developments (e.g. Centre for Sustainable Energy, 
2007, and TLT Solictors, 2007).  
 
The paper proceeds in the following way. In Section 2 we set out the current 
ownership structure for the proposed windfarm on Shetland - Viking Energy. In 
Section 3 we identify the revenues, expenditures and the distribution of profits for this 
windfarm if it were to become operational. These estimates embody plausible 
assumptions about ownership and backward linkages between the development and 
the Shetland Islands economy. In Section 4 we present results for two scenarios. In 
the first, there is no local ownership of the operational windfarm, but Community 
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Benefit payments are made. In the second, there is local retention of a significant 
portion of the ongoing profits from the windfarm through the level of community 
ownership proposed for the Viking Energy project. We carry out sensitivity analysis 
in Section 5, where we vary the scale of CB payments; the degree of intermediate 
input sourcing within the local economy; and the extent of local ownership of the 
renewable energy project. In Section 6 we conclude with a discussion of policy 
implications. 
 
 
2. Outline of the Viking Energy scheme 
 
We illustrate the issues raised in identifying the impact of renewable energy 
developments on local economic activity using the 600MW onshore windfarm that 
has been proposed for the Shetland Islands. This choice is made for three reasons. 
Firstly, island economies are useful for study purposes given the ease of defining the 
spatial boundaries of economic activity. Second, there exists an excellent recent set of 
economic accounts for the Shetland economy, offering a snapshot of the Islands 
economy for the year 2003 (Newlands and Roberts, 2006). Finally, it is proposed that 
this windfarm would be jointly owned by Viking Energy Ltd (VEL)
7
 and Scottish and 
Southern Energy (SSE). It is expected that the revenues to the community from 
having an ownership role would be substantially greater than typical CB payments. 
Clearly, such revenues may be considered as compensation for the community taking 
on larger risks in the early stages of the windfarm. Shetland Islands Council (2004, p. 
1) stated early on that the project, by its nature is being developed on behalf of the 
people of Shetland to try to ensure that a substantial portion of the wealth creation 
potential of the Shetland landscape stays here, for the benefit of the local 
community. The council also notes that the potential size of the development could 
offer an opportunity on a scale with Sullum Voe
8
.  
 
As of mid 2005, VEL and SSE Generation (a subsidiary of Scottish and 
Southern Energy) each had proposals for a 300MW onshore windfarm in the central 
mainland of Shetland. Following a Memorandum of Understanding signed in July 
2005, a General Partnership between these two organisations was signed in January 
2007 (Shetland Islands Council, 2005 and 2007a), giving each VEL and SSE 
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Generation an equal share in this partnership. VEL is a limited liability company, with 
90% of its shares now owned (as of December 2007) by the Shetland Charitable 
Trust.
9
 The ownership stake of the Shetland Charitable Trust was previously held by 
Shetland Islands Council (as raised in Shetland Islands Council (2007b), and 
confirmed by Viking Energy (2007b)). 
 
With an expected total construction budget in the region of £580 million 
(Viking Energy, 2007b), and each partner required to find 50% of this investment, the 
total cost of the project to Viking Energy Ltd would be £290 million. It is stated that 
an equity investment of 10% is common, but that up to 20% of half of the capital 
cost would be required to achieve commercial finance (Viking Energy Ltd, 2007b). 
We thus assume that the total cost to VEL is met through an equity investment of £58 
million (20% of the capital cost), made by its owners in proportion to their share of 
VEL ownership  and so £52.2 million by SCT and £5.8 million invested by the 
owners of the remaining 10% equity in VEL. The remainder of the initial investment 
in the project is met by commercial borrowing.  
 
SCT is able to make an initial investment on this scale due to the considerable 
reserves which have been built up over the last thirty years from the revenues received 
through the deal with BP to establish and operate an oil terminal at Sullum Voe. As of 
December 2007, the reserves of SCT were estimated at £220 million (Wills, 2007) 
and so, while substantial, such an investment would represent around 25% of SCTs 
existing reserves.  
 
Figure 1 shows the current proposed ownership structure for the Viking 
Energy Partnership operational windfarm on Shetland. Under Scenario B, presented in 
Section 3, we quantify the potential economic impact on Shetland of the revenues 
which might be retained locally under this ownership structure. 
 
[Figure 1] 
 
3. Methods 
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Some important characteristics of the proposed windfarm on the Shetland 
Islands are common to many developments of this type in remote or peripheral areas. 
The Shetland electricity network is currently not connected to the UK mainland 
transmission network, so all local demands for electricity must be met by local 
generation. More importantly in the current context, at present electricity generated on 
the Shetland Islands therefore cannot be exported to the UK mainland. The electricity 
produced by a 600MW island windfarm would dwarf the existing electricity demands 
on the Shetland Islands. These are currently met by a 67.2MW capacity diesel-fired 
generator at Lerwick Power Station and the operation of a 3.68MW five-turbine 
windfarm at Burradale that provides up to 18% of electricity demand on the Islands 
(Energy From the Edge, 2007). There are a number of small scale (i.e. individual 
building-level) renewable energy projects that include the use of wind power to 
supply electricity for twelve public halls. The proposed 600MW onshore wind 
development consequently only makes economic sense if the generated power can be 
exported to the GB transmission grid, most likely via an undersea cable link to the 
mainland of Scotland. For the purposes of this paper we assume that all electricity 
generated is exported from Shetland through such a link. We discuss recent estimates 
of the costs of this transmission link in Section 5.6. 
 
A SAM details the flow of money between sectors and final demand 
categories in an economy for a given spatial scale in a specific time period, most 
commonly a year. As with Input-Output tables they provide a snapshot of an economy  
and can be used for both accounting and, accepting certain assumptions, for modelling 
purposes (Thorbecke, 1998). Where IO tables provide details of income from 
production activities, SAMs include full details on all incomes, including, for 
instance, income from transfers (such as pension receipts, or other government 
transfers) or income from savings. As such, they provide a fuller framework for 
impact analysis, one which is arguably more suited to the examination of a rural 
economy, where such transfer flows may be significant (Newlands and Roberts, 
2006).  
 
The Social Accounting Matrix for the Shetland Islands describes the income 
flows in the year 2003 throughout the economy of the Islands (Newlands and Roberts, 
2006). It has five accounts which detail: the incomes and expenditures of thirty-one 
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production sectors (these are given in Appendix 2); the returns to labour and capital 
factors of production; the forms of income accounts, showing where returns to labour 
and capital factors were earned; the household account, providing incomes and 
expenditures details for three categories of households in the Shetland Islands
10
; and 
the local government account. For each of these accounts, the SAM satisfies the 
identity that gross inputs (expenditures) match gross outputs (incomes). The SAM 
also includes all other transactors that make purchases or transfers with the Shetland 
economy, including central government, capital account, savings, tourist spending and 
trading with the rest of Scotland, the rest of the UK and the rest of the world. 
 
 We now briefly outline how the proposed windfarm might be considered 
within a SAM for the Shetland Islands. This requires the creation of an additional row 
and column in the table, corresponding to the operation of Viking Energy windfarm. 
The row contains one value, the exogenous exports of electricity from Viking Energy 
to the rest of Scotland. The column quantifies the intermediate purchases (from other 
production sectors in Shetland) and from imports and primary inputs, including 
payments to wages and payments to other value added. We also identify a separate 
row and column showing the distribution of profits from the windfarm across 
transactors within (and outside) the Shetland Islands economy and the domestic 
expenditures derived from such profits. Note that we do not currently model the 
impact of the construction phase of the windfarm
11
. 
 
Our first step is to identify the transactions which would be likely to occur in 
the Shetland economy if the windfarm becomes operational. We therefore set out our 
assumptions regarding the revenue and operational expenditures for the windfarm in 
the course of a year. Section 3.1 gives the sources of revenue for the windfarm, while 
Section 3.2 identifies the nature and levels of expenditures. Section 3.3 shows how the 
distribution of profits from the windfarm might be treated under two scenarios  
Scenario A, in which the communities link to the project is through Community 
Benefit payments, and Scenario B, in which the community makes an investment in 
the ownership of the project, and therefore retains a share of the profits. More detail 
on each of these items of revenue and expenditure are provided in Appendix 3. In the 
text, the revenue and expenditure figures have been calculated in 2003 prices, to make 
it consistent with the base year of the SAM. 
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 3.1 Windfarm operational revenue 
 
Total revenue for an onshore windfarm in the UK consists of four elements: 
the sale of electricity generated; the sale of Renewable Obligations Certificates 
(ROCs) earned in relation to the amount of electricity generated; income from buyout 
payments made by electricity suppliers unable to source ROCs and so paying the 
buyout price
12
; and the sale of Climate Change Levy Exemption Certificates (IPA 
Energy Consulting/Brodies, 2003). All these elements are linked to the amount of 
electricity generated by the operational windfarm in any year. These revenues are 
shown in Table 1 and explained in the subsequent text. More details on each element 
are provided in Appendix 3. 
 
[Table 1] 
 
 The amount of electricity produced will be a function of the rated capacity of 
the windfarm and the capacity factor (i.e. the expected electricity generated as a 
proportion of output if the farm was operated at maximum capacity for 100% of the 
time). We follow Viking Energy Ltd (2008) in assuming the 600 MW onshore 
windfarm capacity has a realisable capacity factor of 45%, implying an annual 
production of 2,365,200 MWh. The value of the electricity is obviously uncertain, but 
Viking Energy Ltd (2008) assume a range of between £20 and £40 per MWh. We 
assume the mid-point of this range is achieved, perhaps through the selling of output 
from the windfarm through a fixed-price Power Purchase Agreement (PPA). At £30 
per MWh (in 2005 prices), the total revenue from sales of electricity is estimated as 
£67.6 million, after deflation to 2003 prices. 
 
 Accredited renewable generation in the UK earns Renewable Obligation 
Certificates (ROCs) for each MWh of electricity produced. Electricity supply 
companies must provide certificates to cover a growing share of the electricity they 
supply, and so renewable generators are able to sell their ROCs in a GB-wide market 
(which operates, in theory, independently of the sale of the electrical output of the 
windfarm)
13
. Viking Energy Ltd (2008) assume a unit price for each ROC of £26.59. 
This gives annual revenue from ROC sales (in 2003 prices) of £59.9 million. This is 
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only £8 million less than the total revenues from the sale of electricity and reflects 
how important the ROC support mechanism is for the economics of onshore wind 
generation. Further, where electricity suppliers are unable to source ROCs to cover 
the required share of electricity they supply, they must pay the buyout price for each 
certificate they are short. The total value of the resulting buyout fund is recycled back 
to accredited renewable generators in proportion to each generators share of total 
ROCs submitted in that period. Viking Energy Ltd (2008) assumes a recycled value 
per ROC of £5, implying annual (2003 prices) revenue from this source of £11.3 
million. The figures we employ thus assume a price of £31.59 per ROC (including 
both the sale and recycled buyout elements). 
 
Finally, renewable electricity generators also earn Climate Change Levy 
Exemption Certificates (LECs). The current rate for these LECs is 4.3p/kWh. Viking 
Energy Ltd (2008) assume that 80% of this rate is achieved, so each LEC earns 
3.44p/kWh, giving a total additional revenue per year of £7.8 million in 2003 prices. 
 
Summing across all sources of revenue, total annual revenue for the offshore 
600MW windfarm is estimated to be £146.5 million (in 2003 prices) equating to an 
average of £65.03/MWh in 2003 prices.  
 
3.2  Windfarm operational expenditures 
 
Total expenditures for an onshore windfarm in the UK consist of seven 
elements, and we show our estimates for each of these expenditure for the Viking 
Energy project in Table 2. First, there are the costs of employing local workers to 
maintain the facility. Second, there may be local purchases of inputs for parts required 
for operation and maintenance. Third and fourth, there are taxes paid to central and 
local government. Fifthly, there are parts required for operations and maintenance 
which will be imported into the Shetland Islands. Sixth, there are charges for access 
to, and use of, the GB electricity transmission network, while the seventh category of 
operational expenditures comprises residual rents paid to capital. With the exception 
of business rates, payable to local government, and charges for use of the GB 
electricity transmission network these elements are typically related to the amount of 
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electricity generated by the windfarm in any year. As with operational revenue, more 
details on the elements of expenditures are provided in Appendix 3.  
 
[Table 2] 
 
In calculating the figures for Table 2, we assume that the Viking Energy 
(2008) estimates of total operational expenditures include the costs of employment, 
local purchases and both local and central government taxes (but exclude 
Transmission Network Usage of System (TNUoS) charges). Viking Energy (2008) 
give total operational costs as £16/MWh. We assume that any difference between 
total operational expenditures and the sum of these three elements (covering parts and 
equipment for operation and maintenance) is spent on imports to Shetland. The 
TNUoS charges which will apply are then estimated. Finally, payments to capital are 
treated as the residual between total windfarm revenues and the sum of all other 
expenditures.  
 
Local employment 
 
Figures for the employment directly required by an operational windfarm vary 
depending on the assumptions made about the type and number of turbines, their need 
for servicing and the extent to which appropriately qualified staff can be sourced with 
the local economy. We estimate that the windfarm would have 53.65 FTE employees, 
meaning a total compensation of employees figure (after adjustment to 2003 prices) of 
£2.2 million.
14
 
Local purchases 
 
The island windfarm will make purchases from a range of intermediate 
sectors, locally and from the rest of Scotland, the rest of the UK and the rest of the 
world. As in Allan et al. (2007), we initially assume that there are no purchases from 
the Shetland economy from the operation of the windfarm, so that all elements 
required for production are imported into the Shetland economy. We explore the 
effects of changing this assumption in our sensitivity analysis. 
 
 13
Taxes paid to local and central government 
 
We assume that taxes paid on products to central government make up the 
same proportion of total expenditure as was the case for the wind generation sector in 
Scotland in Allan et al. (2007). On a turnover of £146.6 million, the windfarm would 
contribute a total of £8.1 million in taxes to central government. For taxes paid to 
local government, the established mechanism is through payments of local business 
rates. We assume that the payments from the operational windfarm to local 
government in Shetland amount to £3000 per MW per year (in 2005 prices), giving a 
total annual payment from the windfarm (from rates) to local government of £1.7 
million (in 2003 prices).  
 
Imports to Shetland 
 
We make the assumption that total imports to Shetland of parts for operations 
and maintenance constitute the residual between total operating expenditure after 
subtracting payments to wages and local and central government. The residual figure 
here is £24.1 million (in 2003 prices).  
 
Charges for use of Transmission Network 
 
All generators with installed capacity of greater than 10MW and suppliers of 
electricity connected to the transmission network (i.e. not to the distribution network) 
must apply for Transmission Entry Capacity (TEC), for which an annual 
Transmission Network Usage of System (TNUoS) charge is levied. Generators pay in 
relation to the size of the installed capacity, and their location in one of twenty one 
zones set by Ofgem. The major island groups of Scotland (i.e. Shetland, Orkney and 
the Western Isles) are not connected to the transmission network, and so do not have 
TNUoS tariffs. Uncertainty surrounding the likely TNUoS charges are reflected in the 
wide range of possible values used by Viking Energy for the Shetland windfarm, of 
between £40 and £100 per kW of installed capacity per year. We assume a TNUoS 
charge of £70 per kW per year, the mid point between these two figures. This 
translates to an annual payment by the operational windfarm of £40.0 million (in 2003 
prices). 
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 Payments to capital (Profits) 
 
Since the column and row totals of the windfarm-augmented SAM must be 
equal (i.e. gross expenditures must equal gross revenues), we treat payments to capital 
as the residual income remaining after all the expenditures detailed above have been 
deducted from total revenue. As shown in Table 2 above, this totals £70.5 million per 
annum.  
 
From the expenditure figures and summarised in Table 2, we can construct the 
new column representing the Viking Windfarm on Shetland. These are given in 
Figure 2. The first figure under each category reports the value of this expenditure in 
£ million, while the second reports the share of total expenditure in each category. 
 
[Figure 2] 
  
Note that over ninety per cent of expenditure is on imports to Shetland 
(including expenditures on TNUoS charges) and payments to capital. Backward 
linkages from the operational windfarm (i.e. local intermediate purchases and local 
payments) are very small, relative to turnover. Local tax payments are a further 
linkage between the windfarm and the local economy, but in standard Input-Output 
models such payments are considered leakages from the economic system. Where 
such payments are recycled back into the local economy, there will be economic 
impacts. The potential importance of payments to capital (i.e. profits to owners) can 
clearly be seen. In Section 3.3, we explain our assumptions for two scenarios for the 
distribution of these profits.  
 
3.3  Treatment of profits in the SAM 
 
As stated in Section 3 above, we add an additional row and column into the 
SAM representing respectively the profit income to, and distribution of profits from, 
the windfarm. The row is constructed to show that operational profits are earned in 
the new windfarm sector, while the column shows the distribution of these profits 
across all possible beneficiaries, i.e. local households, local (and central) government 
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and transfers out of Shetland. Since we are considering a standalone single-region 
SAM for Shetland, it is assumed that transfers to any of these regions from the 
Shetland economy will have no economic feedback effects on to the Shetland 
economy.
15
 We consider two scenarios, labelled A and B. Each scenario implies a 
different distribution in the windfarm profit column. In both Scenario A and Scenario 
B we use plausible assumptions about the destination of these profits across all 
possible transactors. We vary a number of key assumptions in sensitivity analysis in 
Section 4. 
 
3.3.1 Scenario A 
Rental payments to landowners 
 
As noted by Viking Energy (2008), the project will have to pay land rentals to 
landowners under the footprint of the proposed windfarm. The main landowner just 
happens to be the Shetland community. The Shetland SAM for identifies three 
categories of households  those with no children, those with children and retirees. In 
all, we estimate that rental payments to landowners imply a £1.3 million payment to 
the Shetland Islands Council annually (the major owner of the land on which the 
windfarm will be located), and a total of £0.2 million being distributed annually 
among the three categories of households featured in the SAM. Seventy-five per cent 
of this total is estimated to go directly to households with children. Households 
without children and retired households receive respectively 23 per cent and 2 per 
cent of total rental payments to households. 
 
Community Benefit payments 
 
As noted above, renewable energy developers may also make Community 
Benefit (CB) payments. These are negotiated on a facility-by-facility basis and are 
currently the most widely used route by which owners of renewable energy projects 
provide funds to local communities. These payments are either based upon the 
installed capacity of the windfarm  and so the developer makes fixed real payments 
per MW annually (rising in line with inflation)  or payments are dependent on the 
productivity of the windfarm, and made per MWh of electricity actually generated. In 
some cases, lump-sum Community Benefit payments may also be made, but these are 
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not linked to the operational activities of the windfarm (although they are likely to 
vary with capacity). Where lump-sum payments are made, these tend to occur 
whenever the construction of the windfarm is complete. Appendix 1 shows that a 
number of windfarm projects in Scotland combine all three of these Community 
Benefit mechanisms. 
 
Existing CB payments from operational windfarms to local communities 
(described in detail in Appendix 1) lie between an equivalent of £1000 and £5000 per 
MW per year
16
. In our Scenario A, we assume that there is no local ownership of the 
operational onshore windfarm, and so Community Benefit payments are made in each 
period by the owners of the windfarm to the Island community. We assume CB 
payments in Scenario A equivalent to an annual payment of £3000/MW installed 
capacity. In sensitivity analysis in Section 4, we examine the economic impact of 
varying the level of this payment
17
. 
 
Transfers of profits outside Shetland 
 
Under Scenario A all the remaining profits from the windfarm will be earned 
by a firm based outside Shetland. This represents a leakage of revenues from the 
Shetland economy, and we assume that these profits have no additional impact on the 
Shetland economy.  
 
Scenario A: Summary of distribution of profit income 
 
From the preceding analysis, we can construct the new column for the 
Shetland SAM representing the distribution of profit income from the Viking 
Windfarm on Shetland between transactors under our central case of zero local 
ownership, but CB payments equivalent to £3000/MW. These are represented in 
Figure 3. As with Figure 2, the value of profits to each category is given first (in 
£million), and the shares of total profits are given second. In the central case, almost 
96 per cent of total profits are repatriated from Shetland as transfers to the project 
owner, with a combined total of £3.30 million remaining in the Shetland Islands 
economy. This comprises £0.21 million as land rental payments to Shetland Islands 
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householders, £1.37 million to the SIC through taxes paid to local government and 
land ownership and £1.72 million to the SCT as Community Benefit payments.  
 
[Figure 3] 
 
3.3.2 Scenario B: 50% local share of ownership 
 
Rental payments to landowners 
 
We assume the same aggregate rental payments to landowners, and their 
distribution, as discussed above for Scenario A. 
 
Community Benefit payments 
 
 We assume that since the community has an ownership stake in the project it 
does not receive CB payments as well. 
 
Profits retained locally 
 
One of the unique aspects of the development of the Viking Energy windfarm 
is that the Shetland Charitable Trust (SCT) will invest a significant portion of their 
reserves of community funds in the project for a 50 per cent share of ownership 
profits from the operation of the development. As stated in Section 2 above, the 
remaining balance to fund SCTs 50% investment in the project costs will come from 
commercial borrowing. This level of community ownership in renewable energy, 
while not unprecedented, would be the first of its kind for a project of this scale in 
Scotland. The community funds held by Shetland Islands Council, through the SCT, 
make this level of investment in the proposed windfarm feasible for the Shetland 
community. It has been estimated that, as of late 2007, reserves of the SCT total 
around £214 million (Wills, 2007).
18
  
 
For ease of analysis, we assume that the SCT will spend its receipts from 
profits in the same pattern as existing Local Government expenditure in the base year 
of the SAM. We could explore alternative treatments of the profits earned by the 
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community by constructing an alternative expenditure vector, but in the absence of 
any relevant information, we do not pursue this further here. In fact, any charitable 
trust would be able to direct funds to projects as it desired, and so, in practice, their 
use of funds is unlikely to reflect exactly the pattern of existing local government 
spending. Further, as with revenue gained during the operation of Sullum Voe (Wills, 
1991), we would also want to explore the implications of revenues being accrued to 
build up financial reserves (rainy day funds) for the longer-term benefit of the 
Island community. 
 
We calculate the profits retained, and spent, by the Shetland Charitable Trust 
in the following way. From total profits, we subtract the payments to landowners 
specified above. From the remainder we subtract the half share which goes to the 
partner to the Viking Energy partnership  SSE Generation  as this is earned by the 
subsidiary to Scottish and Southern Energy from its ownership stake in the operation 
of the windfarm. This is estimated as £34.4 million. The ownership stake in Viking 
Energy Ltd held by the directors of Shetland Aerogenerators Ltd is held by 
individuals and not community groups, and so we make the assumption that their 
profit income is not spent locally
19
. This is therefore a further leakage from Shetland 
of £3.44 million, leaving £31.0 million as the annual operational profit income 
accruing to the Shetland Charitable Trust (before interest payments). As discussed in 
Section 2, while a significant equity investment will be made by SCT in the upfront 
costs of the project, we assume that 80% of its share of the total project costs is raised 
through commercial borrowing, for which a commercial rate of interest will be 
payable. The specific terms of this borrowing will depend upon conditions in the 
market at the time that funds are sought. As stated in Section 2, we assume that 50% 
ownership requires upfront investment of £290 million, and that 20% of this (£58 
million) is met from existing SCT revenues. This is towards the upper end of the size 
of the total equity investment that will be made by SCT. This leaves required 
commercial borrowing of £232 million. Assuming that these prices are in 2007 prices, 
deflating to 2003 prices produces a total borrowing figure of £209.7 million. It is 
difficult to predict the rate of interest which would be payable by SCT for this 
borrowing, but we take an indicative rate of interest of 7.5%, giving an annual interest 
figure of £15.7 million. Subsequent years of operation will mean that the interest 
payment will either be lower, or this nominal repayment will be made in each year, in 
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which case the original debt would be paid off in around 14 years
20
. Subtracting the 
debt repayment charge of £15.7 million from SCT total profit revenues gives a 
retained income for SCT of £15.3 million. This is in addition to the payments made to 
the Shetland Islands Council and land rental payments made to households. In total 
therefore, we estimate that £16.86 million annually will be retained and spent in the 
Shetland Islands economy under Scenario B. 
 
Scenario B: Summary of distribution of profit income 
 
We can now construct the new column for the Shetland SAM representing the 
distribution of profit income from the Viking Windfarm between transactors under 
Scenario B where the local community have a significant ownership stake. These 
results are represented in Figure 4. Again, the value of profits in each category is 
given first, and the share of total profits is given second. In this scenario, £16.86 
million remains within the Shetland Islands economy, over five times as much as is 
retained in Scenario A. The land rental payments to Shetland Islands householders 
and taxes paid to local government are the same as in Scenario A. But now £15.27 
million (previously £1.72 million) is paid to the SCT as co-owner of the operational 
windfarm. In total the proposed organisation of the Viking Energy windfarm would 
retain around 24% of the total operational profits within the Shetland economy. 
Again, we explore the impact of varying this share in sensitivity analysis in Section 5. 
 
[Figure 4] 
 
4. Results: Direct Impacts, Scenario A and Scenario B 
 
The local (Shetland) economic impact of the island windfarm is estimated 
using the SAM for Shetland with the additional column and row for the Viking 
Energy windfarm, showing sales and purchases, and the additional column and row 
showing the treatments of profit incomes under the two central scenarios
21
. With the 
new element of final demand, that of electricity exports from Shetland to the rest of 
the UK, totalling £146 million, the new levels of GDP and employment can be 
calculated. These are then compared to the base line levels of these variables (for 
2003) and the differences can be attributed to the operation of the 600MW windfarm.  
 20
  As with Input-Output (IO) analysis, SAM modelling is a commonly used 
multi-sectoral general equilibrium modelling approach. Such models, however, make 
a number of restrictive assumptions (Miller and Blair, 1985). Conventional IO and 
SAM modelling assume that economic activity is demand-driven. Variants exist to 
this approach, in which supply can drive quantities, or in which price changes can be 
modelled, but is it not possible to model quantities and prices simultaneously. As 
such, any changes in economic competitiveness cannot be systematically modelled. In 
production, it is assumed that sectoral expenditure coefficients remain constant, in 
effect, that average and market costs of production remain equal and constant as 
output expands. Production functions are linear, so that with constant expenditure 
coefficients there are constant returns to scale between inputs and output (McCann, 
2001). If output of a particular sector increases by 5%, for instance, the sector will 
increase its demand for all inputs by 5%. These assumptions are typically understood 
to be a good approximation in regions where there are unemployed resources, or for a 
regional economy where all constraints on supply are relaxed in the long-run 
(McGregor et al., 1996). 
 
4.1 Results from two scenarios 
 
Given the assumptions for operational revenue and expenditure and the 
distribution of profits detailed through Section 3 our results for GDP and employment 
are shown in Table 3. 
 
[Table 3] 
 
These effects are large relative to the Shetland Island economy as a whole, 
particularly for GDP. In the initial SAM, the GDP of Shetland and level of 
employment were £333.4 million and 9109 respectively. The direct impact of the 
Viking Energy windfarm therefore raises GDP and employment respectively by 
21.8% and 0.6%. A windfarm with an installed capacity of 600 MW, no local 
ownership, but plausible assumptions for the level of community benefit is estimated 
to raise GDP by 24% and to raise Shetland employment by almost 3%. Retaining 24% 
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of the profits returned from this project within the Shetland Islands raises GDP by 
30.9% and employment by 9%. 
 
4.2 Scenario A 
 
 Under this scenario, including the operation of the windfarm itself, the sum of 
direct, indirect and induced effects on the Shetland economy is an increase in GDP of 
£78.9 million, with an additional 270 FTE jobs. Direct GDP and employment for the 
hypothetical 600MW windfarm is £72.6 million and 54 FTE jobs respectively. There 
are thus low indirect and induced benefits to the Shetland economy, which in this 
scenario come through the assumed Community Benefit payments, additional 
employment, additional taxation revenues to Shetland Local Government and 
payments to Shetland residents. The GDP multiplier is 1.09, while the employment 
multiplier is 5.00. This is primarily due to the low employment intensity of the 
windfarm and high employment-intensity of the sectors that are assumed to benefit 
from the additional SCT spending. 
 
 The sectoral economic activity and employment impacts can be seen in Figure 
5. All sectors show a positive stimulus. This is because we assume that there is no 
crowding out of economic activity, for instance, through raising prices and drawing in 
labour or capital from other sectors. The Public administration, School education 
and Social work sectors are stimulated the most  increasing by 6.98 per cent, 6.98 
per cent and 5.22 per cent respectively. These are all sectors in which local 
government purchases are concentrated. This shows that our assumption about the use 
of community funds is crucial for sectoral results. 
 
[Figure 5] 
 
4.3 Scenario B 
 
Under this scenario, including the operation of the windfarm itself, the sum of 
direct, indirect and induced effects on the Shetland economy is an increase in GDP of 
£95.0 million, with an additional 831 FTE jobs. Direct GDP and employment for the 
hypothetical 600MW windfarm is £72.6 million and 54 FTE jobs respectively. There 
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are thus significantly greater indirect and induced benefits to the Shetland economy 
under this scenario compared to Scenario A. The GDP multiplier rises compared to 
Scenario A, to 1.31, while the employment multiplier in Scenario B (15.39) is more 
than tripled. 
 
The estimated impact on aggregate GDP and employment is very large  
raising these by 28.5 per cent and over 9 per cent respectively. The impacts on 
sectoral economic activity is shown in Figure 6. While the pattern of sectoral changes 
is similar to Scenario A, note the change in the scale of the vertical axis. Again, those 
sectors in which local government expenditures are focused record the largest 
changes. The Public administration, School education and Social work sectors 
increasing by 26.5 per cent, 26.5 per cent and 19.7 per cent respectively. 
 
[Figure 6] 
 
5 Results: Sensitivity Analysis 
5.1 Sensitivity to levels of Community Benefit payments 
 
 As discussed above (and detailed in Appendix 1), a wide range of Community 
Benefit payments have been made between the owners of operational windfarms in 
Scotland and their local communities. In this section we explore the impact that 
alternative levels of CB payments might have on the local Shetland economy. In these 
simulations, we assume zero local ownership as well as zero intermediate inputs 
sourced locally. We vary the levels of Community Benefit payments between zero 
and £6000/MW (which, for this upper bound, relates to an annual payment to the 
Shetland community of £3.4 million in 2003 prices). We show the results for local 
(Shetland) GDP and employment impacts in Table A4.1 in Appendix 4. We see that 
the marginal percentage impact of an additional £500/MW on employment are ten 
times as large as for GDP.  
 
 We can solve the model to find the level of Community Benefit payments 
necessary to be paid to the local community under Scenario A to produce the same 
impact upon GDP and employment as the results seen in Scenario B. We find that this 
is around £26,700/MW. This is well beyond the range of conventional Community 
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Benefit payments for operational windfarm projects in Scotland, and shows the 
importance of ownership in securing access for the local community to the profit 
stream from the renewable energy development. 
 
5.2 Sensitivity to local sourcing of intermediate inputs 
 
 One key area for policy is the extent to which renewable projects are 
embedded in the economy in which they operate. In this case, it has been noted that if 
the 600MW project were undertaken on Shetland, the Council would explore the 
possibility of using local manufacturing facilities for elements of construction, if 
doing so was economically viable. As noted above, in this paper we abstract from the 
construction phase of the project, but in theory the same argument extends to the local 
sourcing of elements for the operation and maintenance of the windfarm. For a 
windfarm we estimate annual operating (i.e. non-wage, and non-tax) costs of £24.1 
million (in 2003 prices). We would expect there to be beneficial local economic 
impacts from local sourcing of the parts and servicing needed by the windfarm. 
 
We consider the impact of varying our assumption about the extent of local 
sourcing for intermediate inputs. In both scenarios presented above, we assumed zero 
per cent of operating costs were spent locally. Five alternative scenarios are 
considered, and compared against the results obtained for Scenario A: 
 
x 5 per cent local sourcing 
x 10 per cent local sourcing 
x 15 per cent local sourcing 
x 20 per cent local sourcing 
x 50 per cent local sourcing 
 
In all cases, the payments to the community through Community Benefit 
payments remain at £3000/MW, taxes paid to local government remain unchanged, as 
do payments to the council/community and private households for land rental. All that 
varies in the five scenarios shown above is that greater shares of the intermediate 
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purchases are made within Shetland, with an equivalent decrease in imports into 
Shetland.  
 
As we have no information about the sectoral purchases of the proposed 
windfarm (for the cases where positive purchases are made directly from local 
economy), we construct an expected expenditure vector to represent the pattern of 
local purchases. This is based upon the expenditure vector for the Shetland Marine 
engineering sector (sector 8 in the original SAM), as we might expect that any local 
purchases made in the operation and maintenance of the Viking Energy windfarm 
would require purchases similar to those of this manufacturing sector.  
 
The results of this sensitivity analysis are shown in Table A4.2 in Appendix 4. 
Further increasing the degree of local sourcing  reading down the columns in Table 
A4.2  it is clear that there are low expected economic impacts from quite sizeable 
increases in the portion of operating expenditures sourced locally. To increase local 
sourcing to 20% only increases the change in GDP by 6%. If the (publicly borne) 
costs of providing appropriately skilled staff, facilities, and equipment were large, it 
might be expected that these would outweigh any expected economic boost to the 
local economy. As with the results reported in Section 5.1, the marginal proportionate 
impacts on employment change are significantly greater than for GDP. 
  
Increasing the local sourcing to 10 per cent of operating expenditures produces 
changes also at the sectoral level, as would be expected. Percentage changes in 
sectoral outputs with the 10 per cent of intermediate inputs being sourcing case are 
shown in Figure 7. 
 
[Figure 7] 
 
Compare Figure 7 with Figure 5, where local sourcing is 0%. With increased 
local sourcing there are large percentage increases in the output of the Other 
manufacturing, Other food and drink processing, Mining and quarrying and 
Communications sectors. The output of all these sectors increases by a greater 
percentage amount than that of the Public administration and School and 
education sectors, the big sectoral winners under the Community Benefit scenario 
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presented above. With zero per cent local sourcing, the output of the Other 
manufacturing, Other food and drink processing, Mining and quarrying and 
Communications sectors increased by 2.1 per cent, 2.0 per cent, 1.5 per cent and 2.3 
per cent respectively. Where local sourcing is 10 per cent, the output of these sectors 
increases in total
22
 by 21.1 per cent, 15.2 per cent, 4.3 per cent and 7.6 per cent 
respectively.  
 
5.3 Joint sensitivity to Community Benefit payments and local sourcing of 
intermediate inputs 
 
 In previous subsections either the share of local sourcing of intermediate 
inputs or the level of community benefit payments respectively remained constant. 
We now report the aggregate impacts when these categories are jointly varied. Figures 
8 and 9 show the GDP and employment impacts of simultaneously varying the CB 
payments and the degree of local sourcing. 
 
[Figure 8] 
 
[Figure 9] 
 
 Scenario A occurs with zero per cent share of intermediate inputs sourced 
locally, and Community Benefit payments of £3000/MWh. In this scenario, the 
estimated GDP impact on Shetland is £78.9 million and the impact on Shetland 
employment is 270. Starting from this central case and increasing the share of 
intermediate inputs sourced locally has little impact upon the aggregate GDP effect. 
(See also Table A4.2 in Appendix 4). Also, simultaneously varying the amount of 
Community Benefit from the central case scenario has a similarly muted effect on 
aggregate output change in the Shetland economy.  
 
5.4 Sensitivity to ownership profits retained locally 
 
Varying the degree of profits which are retained locally will clearly have 
implications for the scale of the local economic impact. We now investigate the 
impact of varying our assumption about the extent of local ownership. Seven 
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alternative scenarios are considered, and can be compared against the results obtained 
from both Scenario A and Scenario B (recall from Section 3.3.2 that in Scenario B 
around 22% of ownership profits are retained within the local economy through the 
SCTs stake in ownership): 
 
x 5 per cent 
x 10 per cent 
x 15 per cent 
x 20 per cent  
x 50 per cent  
x 75 per cent  
x 100 per cent 
 
In all cases, the payments to the community through taxes paid to local 
government remain unchanged, as do payments to the council/community and private 
households for land rental. All that varies in each scenario is the portion of total 
profits that remains within the Shetland Islands. Thus, for scenarios with higher share 
of locally retained profits, the large leakage of profits from Shetland evident in Figure 
3 is reduced. In each of these scenarios, we make the further assumption that there are 
no Community Benefit payments, given that there is community ownership. Local 
sourcing of intermediate inputs remains at zero per cent. Table A4.3 in Appendix 4 
shows the impacts on GDP and employment for both the central case and when we 
increase the share of local ownership. 
 
With zero ownership, the impact on Shetland GDP is £76.9 million, with an 
increase in local employment of 270. In contrast, fifty per cent of ownership revenue 
retained locally gives a total GDP impact of £117.8 million, and increases 
employment on Shetland by 1625 FTE jobs. As with previous sensitivity results, the 
marginal impact on employment change from increases in profits retained locally is 
significantly greater than the marginal impact on GDP change. 
 
5.5 Joint sensitivity to local ownership and local sourcing of intermediate 
inputs 
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  In previous subsections we have kept constant either the share of local 
intermediate inputs sourced locally or local ownership of the proposed onshore 
windfarm. We now report the aggregate impacts when these shares are jointly varied. 
The effects on Shetland GDP are summarised in Figure 10.  
 
[Figure 10] 
 
 We take as a reference scenario the one with zero per cent share of 
intermediate inputs sourced locally, and zero per cent local ownership. Figures 10 and 
11 then show the sensitivity of the GDP and employment change figures to variations 
in the degree of local ownership and the share of intermediate inputs sourced locally. 
For the reference scenario, the estimated GDP impact on Shetland is £76.9 million. 
Increasing the share of intermediate inputs sourced locally has little impact upon the 
aggregate GDP effect. (See also Table A4.2 in Appendix 4). However, varying the 
share of ownership from the reference scenario has a much more dramatic impact. 
The same pattern is observed for the estimated Shetland employment impact, shown 
in Figure 11. Local ownership matters significantly more for local economic impact 
than does local sourcing of intermediate inputs, in this case at least. 
 
Two key assumptions here are that revenues to the local community are all 
spent in the year in which they are generated, and that this spending occurs in the 
same pattern as local government expenditure in the base year. Both of these 
assumptions could be varied, as greater information became available about the likely 
use of the relevant income flows. Where the expenditure of these revenues has 
positive supply-side effects the present analysis is unable to capture them. 
 
[Figure 11] 
 
5.6 Discussion 
 
 The estimates we report are, of course, dependent on our assumptions, 
although we have attempted to make these transparent. One of the most significant of 
these in the present context is the assumed existence of a transmission line connection 
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between the Shetland Islands and the UK mainland transmission network. One report 
has put the cost of constructing this connection, from Shetland to mainland Scotland 
using a 300kV HVDC, at £300 million (tnei report, 2007). However, the high cost of 
a transmission connection to the mainland, and the uncertainty surrounding the 
decision to construct the necessary connection, make the Shetland wind project a 
high-risk project: without the connection, the project has no commercial future. 
 
 We have made assumptions regarding the level of TNUoS charges which 
would be paid by a generator on Shetland seeking to export electricity to the UK 
transmission network. It is argued elsewhere that the charges as currently set are 
penal to island renewables in contravention to European Union directives and should 
be challenged (Xero energy ltd report, 2007). Uncertainty surrounding the likely 
charges adds to the degree of risk associated with the project as a whole, which may 
limit the participation of the private sector in developing these proposals:  
 
[There is] a high degree of regulatory uncertainty surrounding the 
connection and charging arrangements that will be applied to the 
Scottish islands. Decisions need to be made quickly as to how security 
factors will be calculated for subsea links, what the applicable TNUoS 
charge methodology might be, how Section 185 capping methodology 
will be implemented and whether TEC trading can actually be utilised 
in Scotland by renewable generators. (tnei report, 2007)  
 
 The UK Government recently announced (BERR, 2008a) that no capping 
scheme would be required for Orkney and Shetland, and was only marginal for the 
Western Isles. This will be disappointing for those areas which were seeking 
discounted connection charges. Two consultants reports (IPA Energy and Water 
Economics, 2008; Econnect, 2008) were provided as background to the Governments 
decision, and argued that, among other things, the higher capacity factor which would 
be expected for onshore wind in these areas suggested that potential returns to 
investors could be significantly greater than comparable generation on the Scottish 
mainland. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Conventional cost benefit analyses tend to ignore the local economic development 
impact of new renewable energy projects. However, such effects may be critical to the 
acceptance of such projects by host communities, and therefore the ability of the UK 
and Scottish governments to meet their targets for renewable energy. Conventional 
Input-Output impact, or financial appraisal, analyses are however not ideally suited to 
exploring the effects of projects that have little direct linkage, in terms of intermediate 
purchases and employment, to host economies, but may generate significant benefits 
in terms of income flows. Most onshore windfarm developments in the UK are of this 
type. An analysis based on a Social Accounting Matrix approach is able to account 
fully for the income flows while accommodating any direct linkage effect that may 
exist. 
 
Our analysis of a proposed windfarm development on the Shetland Islands 
suggests that local revenue sharing arrangements are vital for the scale of the local 
economic impact in regions that are hosting renewable energy developments, while 
local sourcing of operations and maintenance inputs has small additional effects. The 
deployment of the increased funds available for community purposes proves crucial to 
the scale of the estimated impacts. Not surprisingly, improvements in Community 
Benefit have a positive effect on the host region. However, these benefits are very 
modest relative to those that could be secured from any shared-ownership scheme. 
Both types of benefit may prove useful in persuading local communities to host 
renewable energy projects even given some deterioration in their local environment. 
 
Further development of this SAM-based approach is feasible. First, alternative 
income sharing arrangements could be explored. For example, in practice, some 
portion of community profits may be held in a rainy-day fund to finance future 
expenditures. Some onshore wind developments have proposed raising capital 
through share issues directly to individuals (with local residents given priority). 
Secondly, where data permit, the approach can be extended to include more than one 
region. Such methods are, like IO, however, based on an assumption that there are 
extensive underutilised resources in the host region. This is not a reasonable 
assumption for some local or island economies. Where supply-side constraints are 
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apparent (as, for example, in Jersey (Learmonth et al., 2007)), it would be more 
appropriate to analyse the economic development potential of renewable energy 
projects using Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models, in which the supply-
side of the economy can be more appropriately treated.  
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Appendix 1: Operational Scottish onshore wind farm Community Benefit regimes 
Name Capacity 
(MW) 
Year 
commissioned
Initial lump 
sum to 
community?
Approximate 
equivalent 
annual CB 
figures per 
installed 
MW (£) 
A fixed annual 
payment(normally 
index-linked)? 
An 
annual 
payment 
linked 
to 
output? 
Ardrossan 24 2004 Y 750 Y N 
Artfield Fell 19.5 2005 - - - - 
Beinn an Tuirc 30 2001 N c. 2500 Y Y 
Beinn Ghlas 8.4 1999 N 1109 Y N 
Ben Aketil 23 2007 N 1391 Y Y 
Bilbster 3.9 2008 - - - - 
Black Hill 28.6 2007 N c. 2500 Y Y 
Black Law A 97 2005 N 1000 Y N 
Black Law B 27.6 2006 N 1000 Y N 
Bowbeat 31.2 2002 N 2000 Y N 
Boyndie 
Airfield 
20 2006 N 700 Y N 
Braes 
ODoune 
72 2007 Y 1389 Y N 
Bu Farm 2.7 2002 Y 2222 Y N 
Buolfruich 13 2005 N 0 N N 
Burradale 1.98 2000 - - - - 
Burradale 
extension 
1.7 2003 - - - - 
Burray 0.85 2005 N 235,294 N Y
a
Causeymire 55 2004 Y 1150 Y N 
Cruach Moor 29.75 2004 N 765 Y N 
Crystal Rig 62.5 2004/2007 Y 700 Y N 
Deucheran 
Hill 
15 2001 N c. 2500 Y N 
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Dummuie 10.4 2007 N c. 2000 Y N 
Dun Law 17.6 2000 N 2000 Y N 
Earlsburn 35 2007 N 1000 Y N 
Farr 92 2006 Y 1157 Y N 
Findhorn 
Foundation 
0.75 2006 N c.350 Y n 
Fintry (the 
FREE turbine) 
2.5 2007 N 20,000-
40,000
c
N Y
c
Forss 1, Hill of 
Lybster 
2.32 2003 N 0 N N 
Forss, 
Extension of 
Hill of Lybster 
5.2 2007 N 0 Y
b
N 
Gigha 
Community 
0.675 2004 N c118,500 N Y
d
Greendykeside 
Wind Farm 
4 2007 - - - - 
Hadyard Hill, 
Barr 
120 2006 N 1000 Y N 
Hagshaw Hill 15.6 1995 N 1090 Y N 
Hare Hill 13 2000 - - - - 
Hill of 
Balquhindachy 
0.85 2007 N c. 2000 Y N 
Hill of 
Eastertown 
1.7 2007 N c. 2000 Y N 
Myres Hill 1.9 2001 - - - - 
Novar 17 1997 N 1000 Y N 
Pauls Hill 64.4 2006 N 700 Y N 
Rothes (Cairn 
Uish) 
50.6 2005 N 700 Y N 
Sigurd 1.3 2000 - - - - 
Spurness 11 2005 N 2273 Y Y 
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Wind Farm 
Tangy 12.75 2002 N c. 2500 Y N 
Thorfinn, 
Burgar Hill 
2.75 2002 - - - - 
Wardlaw 
Wood 
18 2006 - 0 - - 
Windy 
Standard 
21.6 1996 N 641 Y N 
WWB Burgar 
Hill 
6 2001 Y 1250 Y N 
 
Sources: Power stations taken from BWEA database of UK renewable energy 
facilities in Scotland and various websites. The authors are responsible for any errors 
or omissions from the above table and would welcome any comments on, or 
corrections to, these data. We acknowledge the other types of financial links, aside 
from CB payments, which may exist between operational windfarms and the local 
community, in footnote 5. 
 
Notes: 
a
 Burray project was fully funded by local investment, so all revenues to owners 
remain within Orkney. 
b
 A Community Benefit scheme will be established, but no details have yet been 
confirmed. 
c
 The Fintry community have ownership of a turbine at the Earlsburn windfarm. 
Constructed at the expense of the developer of the Earlsburn site, the community 
receives between £50,000 and £100,000 per year over the first 15 years of this project, 
with anticipated revenues of between £400,000 and £500,000 once the turbine has 
been paid back from revenues. 
d
 The Gigha Community own and operate the windfarm, with returns (net profit, after 
payment of tax and interest) of around £80,000 for the most recent year. The 
windfarm is expected to be debt free in 2009, when the net profit to the Isle of Gigha 
Heritage Trust  acting on behalf of the community  could rise to between £100,000 
and £150,000. 
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Y in the last two columns indicates that some of the annual Community Benefit is 
based upon a fixed amount, which might be indexed-linked, or linked to the annual 
output of the windfarm. N indicates that this is not the case. 
Cells marked with - indicate that we are awaiting responses from the owner of the 
windfarm to our request for further information. 
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Appendix 2: Production sectors in Social Accounting Matrix for Shetland, 2003 
(Newlands and Roberts, 2006)  
Sector 
number 
Name SIC 2003 code 
1 Agriculture 01,02 
2 Fish catching  05.01 
3 Aquaculture 05.02 
4 Oil terminal  11 
5 Mining and quarrying 10,12,14 
6 Manufacturing: Fish processing  15.20 
7 Manufacturing: Other food and drink 
processing 15 (excluding 15.20) 
8 Manufacturing: Marine engineering 35.11, 35.12 
9 Manufacturing: Textiles and crafts 17,18 
10 Other manufacturing 19 -34, 35 (excluding 35.11 
and 35.12), 36, 37 
11 Electricity, gas and water supply 40,41 
12 Construction 45 
13 Wholesale 51 
14 Retail 50, 52 
15 Accommodation 55.1, 55.2 
16 Catering (including pubs and social clubs) 55.3, 55.4, 55.5 
17 Ports and harbours  63.1, 63.22 (part) 
18 Transportation, Sea 61 
19 Transportation, Land 60, 63.21 
20 Transportation, Air 62, 63.23 
21 Oil supply services 63.22 (part) 
22 Communications and Supplier Services 64 
23 Financial services 65, 66, 67 
24 IT/computer related and real estate services 70, 71, 72 
25 Technical, Professional, other business 
services 73, 74 
26 Public administration - Local/Central 75 (part - local government) 
 44
27 School Education  80.1, 80.21 
28 College Education  80.22, 80.3 
29 Health  85.11, 85.12, 85.14 (part) 
30 Social work and other services 85.13, 85,14 (part), 85.20, 
85.3 
31 Other community, social and personal services 75 (part - central 
government), 80.4, 90 - 
93,95 - 97,99 
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Appendix 3: Detailed assumptions for revenues and expenditures for an operational 
600MW onshore windfarm on Shetland 
 
A2.1 Revenues 
 
A2.1.1 Sale of electricity 
 
As noted in the text, the amount of electricity produced in any period by the 
operational windfarm will be a function of the rated capacity of the windfarm and the 
capacity factor (i.e. the electricity generated as a proportion of the maximum output if 
the farm was operated at maximum capacity for 100% of the time). See Sinden (2005) 
for an introduction to the analysis of the UK wind resource, and the estimation of the 
possible energy that might be extracted from it. The Burradale Wind Farm, beginning 
operation on Shetland in 2000, currently has five-turbines and a total of 3.68MW of 
installed capacity. This windfarm has recorded an operational annual capacity factor 
of 52%. Per unit of installed capacity, this makes the Burradale Wind Farm the most 
productive in the world (Energy from the Edge, 2007). Viking Energy Ltd (2008) 
assumes a 45% capacity factor meaning that an operational windfarm with an 
installed capacity of 600MW would produce 2,365,200MWh in a year
23
. This is more 
conservative than the 48% capacity factor used for Shetland in IPA Energy and Water 
Economics (2008), although Econnect (2008) note that a major developer in the 
region has advised that a range of 45-48% is appropriate. 
 
The value of the electricity produced is obviously uncertain, but may be 
assumed to lie in the range of £20 to £40 per MWh (Viking Energy, 2007). We 
assume an average price of electricity of £30 per MWh electricity produced, giving a 
total (in 2003) prices of £67.6 million.  
 
A2.1.2 Sale of Renewable Obligations Certificates (ROCs) 
 
The Renewables Obligation is a requirement on electricity suppliers to provide 
a growing portion of their electricity from accredited renewable energy generation 
(Ofgem, 2007). Each accredited generator earns one Renewable Obligations 
Certificate per MWh of generation
24
. The electricity supply company must provide 
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certificates to Ofgem (who administer the ROC programme) covering a growing share 
of their electricity sales during each year. The share of generation for which ROCs 
must be provided began at 3% of electricity supplied in 2002-3, is 9.1% in 2008-9 and 
will rise to a current maximum of 15.4% in 2015-16, where it is currently proposed to 
remain until March 2027. Certificates can be bought from accredited generators which 
use renewable energy sources, traded in the ROC market by intermediaries or traded 
between suppliers. This creates a market for a good that can be sold independently of 
the electricity generated by the windfarm. 
 
Viking Energy Ltd (2008) assume a ROC price of £33.24, but since electricity 
is sold through a PPA, they assume that a discounted ROC value equivalent to 80% of 
this price is received. This gives a unit price for each ROC of £26.59
25
. With the 
annual (MWh) generation figure above, this gives annual revenue from ROC sales (in 
2003 prices) of £59.9 million. 
 
A2.1.3 Recycled value from ROC buyout fund 
 
Where electricity suppliers cannot provide ROCs for their requirement they 
must pay the buyout price, set by Ofgem, for each certificate which they are short. 
This began at £30.00 in 2002-3, was set at £33.24 in 2005, and increases annually in 
line with RPI inflation. This effectively sets a ceiling price on the premium paid for 
renewable electricity generation, and limits the cost of compliance to the supplier 
and hence the costs to the consumer (REIC, 2002). All suppliers who are not able to 
meet the share of generation necessary through submitting ROCs must pay the buyout 
price for each ROC they are short, with these payments collected into a buyout fund. 
The total value of the buyout fund is recycled back to accredited renewable generators 
in proportion to each generators share of total ROCs submitted in that period. For the 
five years between 2002-3 and 2006-7, the buyout price paid by suppliers in Scotland 
for each ROC was £23.55, £23.70, £19.99, £10.21 and £16.04 respectively (Ofgem, 
various years). In 2005-6, the buyout price was considerably lower due to a far greater 
share of suppliers obligations met by ROCs (86%) and thus a significantly smaller 
buyout fund to be redistributed  down from £17.6 million in 2004-5 to £7.1 million 
in 2005-6. Viking Energy Ltd (2008) assume a recycled value per ROC of £5, 
implying an annual (2003 prices) revenue of £11.3 million. 
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 A2.1.4 Sale of Climate Change Levy Exemption Certificates 
 
As well as ROCs, electricity generation from renewable sources has, since 
2001, also earned Climate Change Levy Exemption Certificates (LECs). These are 
paid by the consumer of electricity, and the current rate for these LECs, which are set 
in the Finance Act, is 4.3p/kWh. Viking Energy assume that 80% of this rate is 
achieved, so each LEC earns 3.44p/kWh. This means additional revenue to the 
600MW windfarm (in 2003 prices) of £7.8 million in a typical year. Unlike the 
sources of revenue detailed in Sections A2.1.1-A2.1.3, this revenue will not vary with 
either the price of electricity or changes in the nature of the ROC market. 
 
A2.2 Expenditures 
 
We employ Viking Energy estimates of total operational expenditures include 
the costs of employment, local purchases, and both local and central government taxes 
(but exclude Transmission Network Usage of System (TNUoS) charges). In their 
publicly stated calculations, Viking Energy employs an average operational cost 
estimate of £16/MWh, lying at the midpoint between estimates of £14/MWh and 
£18MWh. Previous work for Scottish Enterprise (OHerlihy and Co, 2006) uses a 
figure of £17/MWh for the operational expenditures for Scottish windfarms. For the 
purposes of this paper, we follow Viking Energy (2008), and assume £16/MWh for 
the total of these operational costs. As explained in Section A2.1 above, this exemplar 
windfarm is expected to generate 2,365,200 MWh per year. This then implies total 
annual operational expenditures of £37.8 million. We obtain independent estimates of 
local employment, local purchases and taxes paid to local and central government 
below. We assume that any difference between total operational expenditures and the 
sum of these three elements (covering parts and equipment for operation and 
maintenance) is spent on imports to Shetland.  
 
The TNUoS charges which will apply are then estimated. Finally, payments to 
capital are calculated as the residual between total windfarm revenues and the sum of 
all other expenditures. In Section A2.3, we consider the central case assumption about 
the use of the windfarms profits. 
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 A2.2.1 Local employment 
 
In terms of the employment directly required by an operational windfarm, 
estimates vary depending on the assumptions made about the type and number of 
turbines, their need for servicing and the extent to which appropriately qualified staff 
can be sourced with the local economy. Viking energy, for instance, say that there 
will be 80 full-time equivalent skilled positions during the operational stage for the 
windfarm (this compares to an estimated 110 FTE jobs created during the 
construction stage). We consider this to be towards the upper end of possible direct 
employment impacts for the windfarm for a number of reasons. 
 
OHerlihy and Co (2006) estimate that 30 days servicing a year are required 
for a (2MW) turbine, and that an FTE servicing worker will work 220 days per year, 
at an average hourly rate of £11. Using these same figures, the 600MW planned 
windfarm, therefore, would require 6000 servicing days a year, and with 220 days per 
worker per year, gives a total of 27.3 FTE servicing workers required per year. Using 
an average hourly wage as given by OHerlihy and Co (2006), the total direct costs 
would be £19,360 (2005 prices). Previous IO work (Allan et al., 2007) found average 
total labour costs for wind generation to be £42,342 per worker per year (2000 prices). 
Currently, we have used the mid-point between 27 and 80 for the number of FTE 
employees of the windfarm (53.65) and the higher labour cost figure (from Allan et 
al., 2007), giving a total compensation of employees figure (after adjustment to  2003 
prices) of £2.2million. 
 
A2.2.2 Local purchases 
 
The island windfarm will make purchases from a range of intermediate 
sectors, locally and from the rest of Scotland, the rest of the UK and the rest of the 
world. Previous work has shown that the backward linkages between operational 
Scottish onshore windfarms and intermediate sectors in the Scottish economy is very 
low (Allan et al., 2007). Clearly, the portion of expenditures for the windfarm that are 
made locally will have implications for the local economic impact, and we will 
explore this in the sensitivity analysis.  
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 Viking Energy talks about securing some of the business of the operational 
Shetland windfarm, through support and logistical businesses and engineering 
fabrication. At the construction stage of this windfarm, OHerlihy and Co (2006) 
notes that capital expenditure is, and will be, non-Scottish without intervention. 
Proposals for Viking Energy are that a local manufacturing facility should be 
considered for components such as the turbine blades, but notes this will not be 
advanced unless there is confidence in the sustainability of such a venture. We do 
not include the construction phase here, and it is assumed that if there is any 
replacement necessary that these are not sourced from within the Shetland economy. 
Even if a local manufacturing base, skilled in constructing turbine blades, for 
instance, is developed, this may have little impact on the sourcing of continuing 
expenditures.  
 
As with the work in Allan et al. (2007), we initially assume that there are zero 
purchases from the Shetland economy from the operation of the windfarm, so that all 
elements required for production are imported into the Shetland economy. We explore 
the effects of changing this assumption in our sensitivity analysis. 
 
A2.2.3 Taxes paid to local and central government 
 
In terms of taxes paid on products to central government, we assumed the 
same portion of total expenditure as was the case for the wind generation sector in 
Scotland in Allan et al. (2007). This was 5.5 per cent of turnover, so that, for a 
turnover of £146.6 million, the windfarm would contribute a total of £8.1 million (in 
2003 prices) in taxes to central government.  
 
For taxes paid to local government, the established mechanism is through 
payments of local business rates. OHerlihy and Co Ltd (2006) assume these to be 
around £2500 per installed MW (in 2005 prices). We assume that the payments from 
the operational windfarm to local government in Shetland amount to £3000 per MW 
per year, giving a total annual payment from the windfarm (from rates) to local 
government of £1.7 million (in 2003 prices). 
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A2.2.4 Imports to Shetland 
 
We make the assumption that total imports to Shetland of parts for operations 
and maintenance constitute the residual between total operating expenditure 
(calculated in 2.2 above) after subtracting payments to local wages for local 
employment and payments to local and central government. The residual figure here 
is £24.1 million (in 2003 prices).  
 
The local content of intermediate purchases is assumed to be zero (as 
explained above), but this assumption is varied in later sensitivity analysis. Imports 
from the rest of Scotland, the rest of the UK and the rest of the world do not drive any 
economic activity in the (single-region) SAM model we employ here, so the division 
among these transactors is not be important for our results. However, we make the 
working assumptions that 83 per cent of imports come from the rest of the UK 
(including 43 per cent from the rest of Scotland), with 17 per cent coming from the 
rest of the World. 
 
A2.2.5 Charges for use of Transmission Network 
 
All generators with installed capacity of greater than 10MW and suppliers of 
electricity connected to the transmission network (i.e. not to the distribution network) 
must apply for Transmission Entry Capacity (TEC), for which an annual 
Transmission Network Usage of System (TNUoS) charge is levied. Generators pay in 
relation to the size of the installed capacity, and their location in one of twenty one 
zones set by Ofgem. Charges are designed to recoup the costs to National Grid (who 
operate the Great Britain transmission system) of maintaining the transmission system 
(Xero Energy Ltd, 2007). Only twenty seven per cent of the total cost is recouped 
from generators, with the balance paid by suppliers of electricity. 
 
As mentioned above, these charges differ dependent on what zone 
generators are located in. Designed by Ofgem to be cost reflective, generators and 
suppliers are charged more the further away the generation facility is from centres of 
demand for electricity. The outcome of this is that charges are low in the south of 
England, where demand is strong and currently there is a paucity of generation, and 
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high in the north of Scotland, where the opposite is the case (DTI, 2005). The full 
generation tariffs by zone are given in Table A2. The islands of Scotland (i.e. 
Shetland, Orkney and Western Islands) are not connected to the transmission network, 
and so are not currently included in this table. 
  
Table A2: Generation transmission charges, 2005/6 
Zone Zonal tariff (£/kW) 
Skye 23.10 
North Scotland 20.93 
Western Highlands 18.92 
Peterhead 18.16 
Cruachan 15.85 
Central Highlands 15.36 
Argyll 13.44 
Stirlingshire 12.61 
South Scotland 11.82 
Dinorwig 8.71 
North East England 8.09 
Anglesey 6.12 
Humber, Lancashire and SW Scotland 4.91 
South Yorkshire and North Wales 3.12 
Midlands and South East 1.32 
North London -0.22 
Oxon and South Coast -0.70 
South Wales and Gloucester -2.55 
Wessex -4.95 
Central London -5.71 
Peninsula -8.04 
Source: DTI (2005), Table 1 
 
For generators in Scotland, those connected to the transmission network at 
132kV are not subject to the charge, since this is not classed as a transmission line in 
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England and Wales. Plants with installed capacity of less than 10MW are not charged 
either. 
 
These charges are designed to encourage generation facilities to be located 
closer to centres of community demand, minimising losses from the transmission 
network and therefore reducing overall costs to the consumer. The charges were 
accepted by Ofgem in February 2005, however the charges which would apply for the 
Orkney/Shetland and Western Isles were not set out at this time. A cap on the charges 
from these Islands was announced in March 2005, but the charging regime has yet to 
be finalised. These charges have unsurprisingly attracted significant criticism from 
renewable energy advocates and politicians in Scotland. These groups have argued 
that these charges are excessive, and penalise precisely those peripheral areas of 
Scotland and the UK, which often have the greatest renewable energy resource. This 
is seen as putting at risk the declared UK renewable energy targets by rendering what 
otherwise would be viable renewable energy projects uneconomical.  
 
Uncertainty surrounding the likely scale of the charges are reflected in the 
wide range of possible values used by Viking Energy for the Shetland windfarm, of 
between £40 and £100 per kW of installed capacity per year. A number of authors 
(including Xero Energy Ltd, 2007) have implied that this charging methodology is in 
contravention of European Commission policy, which states: 
 
"Member states shall ensure that the charging of transmission 
and distribution fees does not discriminate against electricity 
from renewable energy sources, including in particular 
electricity from renewable energy sources produced in 
peripheral regions, such as island regions". 
 
One other perspective on the levels of TNUoS charges is that the proposed 
charges are appropriate, and entirely in line with the current remit of Ofgem to 
minimise the cost of electricity paid by consumers. If developments in remote areas 
are to be encouraged it would seem that either the remit should be changed, or 
existing support mechanisms (e.g. such as ROCs) should be banded by area (perhaps 
as well as by technology) to encourage specific developments in specific areas. 
 
 A2.2.6 Payments to capital 
 
Since the column and row totals of the windfarm-augmented SAM must be equal (i.e. 
gross expenditures must equal gross revenues), we treat payments to capital as the 
residual income remaining after all the expenditures detailed above have been 
deducted from total revenue. As shown in Table 2 above, this totals £70.5 million per 
annum.  
 
A3.1 Distribution of profits 
 
A3.1.1 Rental payments to landowners 
 
To estimate the total rental payments to each category of landowners, we need 
four pieces of additional information: 
 
x What determines the annual payments by the owners of the windfarm to 
owners of the land on which the windfarm sits? 
x What portion of the land planned for the Viking Energy windfarm is under 
alternative types of ownership (i.e. owned by council, private landowners and 
crofters respectively)? 
x How are land rental payments to private landowners disaggregated across the 
three household categories? 
x At every stage, what portion of the payments to each category of landowner 
remains within the Shetland economy? 
 
On the first question, OHerlihy and Co (2006) suggest that the annual payments 
to landowners are made in relation to the size of the windfarm, i.e. per installed 
capacity (in MW). In this paper we also assume this, and follow OHerlihy and Co 
(2006) in using annual payments of £3k per MW (2005 prices) installed. For the 
600MW Viking Energy windfarm this suggests an annual rental payment of 
£1.7million (in 2003 prices). We now need to attempt to disaggregate this total land 
rental payments between the categories of land ownership. 
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 Published information on the location of the proposed windfarm, and the 
correlation of that to existing ownership of land on Shetland, is not publicly available. 
In the absence of this information, and in the knowledge that these will likely be 
incorrect, we proceed on the assumption that of all the land used by the windfarm, the 
Shetland Islands council/community owns 80 per cent, private landowners (without 
crofters) own 10 per cent and private landowners (with crofters) own the remaining 
10 per cent. Following the quotation from Viking Energy above, we split the rental 
payments to private landowners with crofters 50:50, such that five per cent of total 
rental payments to landowners are assumed to go to resident crofters, and private 
landowners receive 15 per cent in total.  
 
For private landowners, we assume that half (fifty per cent) of these are resident in 
Shetland, with the implication that half of the payments from the windfarm to private 
landowners are transferred out of Shetland. We assume that all payments made to 
crofters remain in Shetland. 
 
For the distribution of private landowner incomes (remaining in Shetland) across 
household categories we have used the distribution of income from rentals from the 
existing SAM. Using these shares means that we allocate 12.3 per cent of these total 
funds to households with no children, 85.1 per cent to households with children and 
2.6 per cent to retired households. Alternative assumptions could be made, but they 
would not have a significant impact upon aggregate results. For the distribution of 
crofters income, we have used the pattern of incomes from self-employment. This 
gives 37.8 per cent of these funds to households with no children, 61.0 per cent to 
households with children and 1.1 per cent to retirees. 
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Appendix 4: Results from sensitivity analysis 
 
Table A4.1: GDP and employment impacts of variations in level of Community 
Benefit payments 
 Level of Community Benefit payments (£k) 
 0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 4 4.5 5 5.5 6 
GDP impact 76.7 77.2 77.5 77.9 78.2 78.6 78.9 79.2 79.6 79.9 80.3 80.6 80.9
Marginal 
increase in 
GDP (%) 
- 0.65 0.39 0.52 0.39 0.51 0.38 0.38 0.51 0.38 0.50 0.37 0.37
    
Employment 
impact 
199 211 223 234 246 258 270 282 294 305 317 329 341
Marginal 
increase in 
employment 
(%) 
- 6.03 5.69 4.93 5.13 4.88 4.65 4.44 4.26 3.74 3.93 3.79 3.65
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Table A4.2:  Impact on Shetland of 600MW island windfarm, sensitivity in GDP and 
employment to level of local sourcing of intermediate inputs under Scenario A 
Degree of local (i.e. 
Shetland) sourcing 
GDP change 
(£million) 
Marginal 
increase in 
GDP 
change (%) 
Employment 
change 
(FTE jobs) 
Marginal 
increase in 
employment 
change 
Zero per cent (Scenario 
A) 
78.9  270  
5 per cent 80.0 1.39 314 16.30 
10 per cent 81.1 1.38 359 14.33 
15 per cent 82.2 1.36 403 12.26 
20 per cent 83.3 1.34 447 10.92 
 
Table A4.3:  Impact on Shetland of 600MW island windfarm – with variation in the 
extent of ownership profits retained locally 
Percentage of residual 
profits retained locally 
GDP change 
(£million) 
Marginal 
increase in 
GDP 
change 
(%) 
Employment 
change 
(FTE jobs) 
Marginal 
increase in 
employment 
change 
5 per cent 81.0  341  
10 per cent 85.1 5.06 484 41.94 
15 per cent 89.2 4.82 627 29.55 
20 per cent 93.3 4.60 769 22.65 
Scenario B 95.0 1.82 831 8.06 
50 per cent 117.8 24.00 1625 95.55 
75 per cent 138.3 17.40 2338 43.88 
100 per cent 158.8 14.82 3051 30.50 
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Table headings 
 
Table 1: Operational revenues of 600MW island windfarm, by category 
Table 2: Operational expenditures by 600MW island windfarm, by category 
Table 3:  Impact on Shetland of 600MW island windfarm, Direct and under two 
scenarios 
 
 
 58
 Table 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revenue category Unit value assumed 
(2005 prices, before 
deflation) 
Total estimated annual 
revenue (2003 prices) 
Sale of electricity £30 per MWh £67.6 million
Sale of Renewable 
Obligations Certificates 
(ROCs) 
£26.59 per MWh (=per 
ROC) 
£59.9 million
Recycled value from ROC 
buyout fund 
£5 per MWh £11.3 million
Climate Change Levy 
Exemption Certificates 
£3.44 per MWh £7.8 million
Total £65.03 per MWh £146.6 million
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Table 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Expenditure category Total estimated annual expenditures 
(2003 prices) 
Local employment for O&M £2.2 million
Local purchases of inputs to O&M £0.0 million
Taxes paid to central government £8.1 million
Taxes paid to local government £1.7 million
Imports to Shetland £24.1 million
Charges for use of Transmission Network  £40.0 million
Payments to capital (i.e. ownership profits) £70.5 million
Total £146.6 million
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Table 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct Impact 
Scenario A: 
x 0% local 
ownership 
x 0% local 
sourcing of 
inputs 
x £3000/MW CB 
payments 
Scenario B: 
x 50% local 
ownership 
x 0% local 
sourcing of 
inputs 
x 23.9% of profits 
retained on 
Shetland 
GDP (£million) 72.6 (ǻGDPI) 78.9 (ǻGDPTA) 95.0 (ǻGDPTB) 
GDP multiplier  1.09 1.31 
Employment (FTE 
jobs) 
54 (ǻEI) 270 (ǻETA) 831 (ǻETB) 
Employment 
multiplier  
 5.00 15.39 
Note to table: GDP multiplier = ǻGDPTn/ǻGDPI; Employment multiplier = ǻETn/ǻEI, 
where n refers to Scenario A or B respectively. 
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Figure captions 
 
Figure 1:  Ownership structure of the Viking Energy windfarm on Shetland, as of July 
2008 
Figure 2: Expenditures by category for an operational 600MW windfarm (£million 
and percentages of total expenditure, 2003 prices) 
Figure 3: Destination of windfarm profit income between transactors under Scenario 
A, £million (2003 prices) 
Figure 4: Destination of windfarm profit income between transactors under Scenario 
B, £million (2003 prices) 
Figure 5:  Sectoral impact from 600 MW island windfarm, Scenario A 
Figure 6:  Sectoral impact from 600MW island windfarm, Scenario B 
Figure 7:  Sectoral impact from 600MW island windfarm  with 10 per cent local 
intermediate inputs sourcing 
Figure 8:  GDP impact on Shetland of 600MW island windfarm  joint variation in 
Community Benefit payments and local sourcing of intermediate inputs 
Figure 9:  Employment impact on Shetland of 600MW island windfarm  joint 
variation in Community Benefit payments and local sourcing of 
intermediate inputs 
Figure 10:  GDP impact on Shetland of 600MW island windfarm  joint variation 
in local ownership and local sourcing of intermediate inputs 
Figure 11:  Employment impact on Shetland of 600MW island windfarm  joint 
variation in local ownership and local sourcing of intermediate inputs 
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Figure 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Viking
Energy
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
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Generation
Scottishand
Southern
Energy
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Charitable
Trust
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Ltd
50%
50%
45%5% subsidiary
 
Notes: Percentages relate to the share of ownership of the total Viking Energy 
Partnership. 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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Figure 4 
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Figure 5  
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Figure 6 
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Figure 7 
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Figure 8 
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Figure 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
£50
0/M
W
£15
00/M
W
£30
00/M
W
£45
00/M
W
£60
00/M
W
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
Lo
ca
l (S
he
tla
n
d)
 
em
pl
o
ym
en
t i
m
pa
ct
, 
FT
E 
job
s
Level of Community Benefit payments (£/MW)
Share of intermediate inputs 
sourced locally
Scenario A
 
 71
Figure 10 
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Figure 11 
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1 This probably reflects the influence of earlier UK Treasury Green Book guidance, which generally 
assume that employment associated with local regeneration would be crowded out in the UK as a 
whole, so that any employment stimulus in the host economy would be matched by equal contractions 
elsewhere (HM Treasury, 2003). 
2 IO studies looking at the economic impact of sectors on rural areas include Psaltopoulos and 
Thomson (1993) and Crabtree et al. (1994), while Courtney et al. (2006) estimate local income and 
employment multipliers to quantify the indirect and induced economic impacts of natural heritage 
businesses on the local economy. 
3 Indirect effects capture the extent to which an change in demand for the output of a sector (the Direct 
effect) changes demand for the output of other sectors as inputs are required to produce that additional 
output, and as inputs to the production of sectors which are indirectly stimulated. An change in output 
will change the income earned by workers across the economy. Induced effects describe the additional 
impact on economic activity from the spending of this income (Miller and Blair, 1985). 
4 The four energy developments they studied were a coal liquefaction plant, two coking plants and an 
industrial park for coal-based enterprises proposed for a county in northern West Virginia. 
5 Other financial interactions between renewable energy developments and the community in which 
they are based could also include the following: sponsorships to or donations of local projects; the 
provision of apprenticeships; and training or educational opportunities, such as providing tours or 
participating in other community projects. All projects will make payments to the local community 
through local business rates, and through payments to the landowners on which the project is based, 
and these are discussed at the appropriate sections which follow, and considered in our analysis. 
6 Revisions to the planning systems were published in 2000 (Scottish Executive, 2000) and a revised 
Planning Advice Note in 2002 (Scottish Executive, 2002). 
7 A company formed to represent Shetland Islands Council (SIC)s interests in large-scale wind energy 
development in Shetland. 
8 See Wills (1991) for a discussion of the agreement reached between the Shetland Islands Council and 
the users of this oil terminal. 
9 The remaining 10% are held between the four directors of Shetland Aerogenerators Ltd (Shetland 
Islands Council, 2006). 
10 These are households with children, households with no children and retiree households (Newlands 
and Roberts, 2006). 
11 Our focus is on the economic impact of the ongoing revenues from the operational stage of the 
windfarm. Constructing onshore windfarms can create significant opportunities for local companies, 
although a large portion of the construction expenditures are likely to be on goods and services 
imported into the region. It is likely that such opportunities would be in the construction of access 
routes and roads to the development, rather than for the turbine erection services where the 
engagement of local contractors for this activity is likely to be negligible (see OHerlihy and Co. Ltd, 
2006). The impact of the construction phase could be incorporated into this analysis, but the effects 
would, of course, be transitory. 
12 The total revenue from this fund is distributed back to those generators earning ROCs. 
13 Under a PPA the counterpart to the contract will pay the renewable energy generator a fixed amount 
for output which generally will cover all components of revenue, and so the ROC will not be sold 
separately from the electricity. 
14 Our calculations are close to the estimate of VEL of 55 FTE workers directly employed during the 
operation and maintenance stage of the project (Viking Energy, 2007). 
15 This seems reasonable given the small scale of the Shetland economy when compared to the UK 
economy as a whole. 
16 In Appendix 1 we describe only the Community Benefits payments linked to transmission network 
connected onshore wind projects in Scotland that are operational as of April 2008. 
17 In scenarios where there is local ownership, we assume that there are no CB payments. 
18 Shetland Islands Council (2008) details the current dues levied on users of the Sullum Voe harbour, 
which is owned and operated by Shetland Islands Council as Harbour Authority. Wills (1991) provides 
a detailed analysis of the growth of council reserves in Shetland through revenues linked to the 
construction and operation of the Sullum Voe Oil Terminal on Shetland. Wills (2007) updates this to 
include details of negotiated changes to the levies paid by users of the harbour and terminal since 1991. 
19 In practice, these directors share may remain locally as these directors are likely to be Shetland 
Islands residents. 
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20 Viking Energy (2007b) reports that the debt taken on by the communitys would be paid off within 
10 to 11 years, so our figures for annual debt repayments may be slightly higher , making our economic 
impact for this scenario conservative. 
21 There will, of course, be a different SAM matrix under Scenario A from Scenario B, giving the 
assumptions about the distribution of profits in each case. 
22 That is, compared to the base year data. 
23 600 (MW rated capacity) x 0.45 (assumed capacity factor) x 8760 (hours per year) = 2,365,200 
MWh per year estimated generation.  
24 Banding of the ROCs has been proposed (BERR, 2008b), under which higher numbers of 
certificates would be given to renewable energy generators using alternative generation technologies. 
Under the proposed changes, onshore wind would continue to earn 1 certificate per 1 MWh. 
25 Independent estimates from an advisor to renewables energy developers suggested ROC prices in 
PPAs would currently be around the £45 to £50 per ROC range, although this would include the 
recycled value from the buyout fund. 
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